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Abstract 
This paper extends the induced innovation research of Hayami and Ruttan by including 
129 more countries, extending the time frame to 50 years and explaining the production 
process for those countries using a Cobb-Douglas function. From this data, the paper 
illustrates trade-offs between five inputs in agricultural production in empirical isoquants, 
and measures the progress of agricultural productivity by the magnitude of the shift in 
isoquants toward the origin.  We can further test the implications of technical change on 
the productivity of the inputs: labor, land, fertilizer, and capital.  We illustrate the 
response of input demands to rising agricultural wages and estimate scale and substitution 
effects using the fundamental law of derived demand. Lastly, we explore possible 
explanations for variation in agricultural productivity increases across countries by 
examining the relationship between countries’ trade protection policies and democracy 
level and unit labor costs. 
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Agriculture provides a particularly useful industry to evaluate technical change, 
productivity growth, factor substitution, and input demands.  The measures of outputs are 
common across countries and time, but there are many different technologies employed 
to produce that common output.  Hayami and Ruttan’s (1971, 1985) path-breaking work 
represented the first systematic evaluation of the factors inducing innovation across 
countries by exploiting that variation in agricultural inputs, outputs, and technology use.  
They concluded that the adoption of mechanization was driven by rising relative costs of 
labor while population pressures induced the development of fertility improving land 
management practices and improved genetics.  
This study extends the Hayami-Ruttan research agenda by including 3 more 
decades and 129 more countries than they had available.  The 50-year time span from 
1960-2010 and inclusion of data from 173 countries allow us to make several useful 
additions to Hayami and Ruttan’s analysis.  First, we show that the data are well-
described by the Cobb-Douglas form which allows us to graphically illustrate the 
changing shapes of isoquants over the 50-year period.  In particular, we can demonstrate 
and measure the progress of agricultural productivity by the magnitude of the shift in 
isoquants toward the origin for each input pair in the production process.  That strategy 
will allow us to test the implications of technical change on the productivity of labor, 
land, fertilizer, and capital.  
The data also allow us to demonstrate how input use varies with agricultural 
wages.   Like Hayami and Ruttan, we illustrate how labor costs influence mechanization 
in agriculture, but we are able to measure the long-run responses of other inputs to labor 
  3 l Page
costs as well.  Finally, we measure the pace of technical change in agriculture across 
countries and explore how trade protection of the agricultural sector and lack of political 
freedom slow the pace of a country’s agricultural productivity growth. 
Literature Review 
Hayami and Ruttan viewed labor costs as a key driving force toward mechanization of 
agriculture.  More recent work on changes in agricultural productivity over time has also 
focused on the role of labor in improving or hindering efficiency gains in the agricultural 
sector.  Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh (2014) report large differences in labor productivity 
between nonagricultural and agricultural sectors.  The agricultural productivity 
disadvantage is particularly pronounced in developing countries, and thus gaps in labor 
productivity between developed and developing countries are larger in agricultural than 
in nonagricultural sectors.  These large gaps in sectoral productivity suggest that there are 
substantial inefficiencies in labor allocation with too many workers allocated to 
agriculture in developing countries.  Lagakos and Waugh (2013) argue that part of the 
inefficient labor allocation in developing countries is due to the necessity of producing 
sufficient food in the face of poor aggregate productivity.  In effect, the large share of 
labor devoted to agricultural production in developing countries is a constrained choice 
dictated by the need to produce a subsistence level of food using relatively less 
productive agricultural production methods. 
This discussion is reminiscent of an older discussion of whether peasant farmers 
are poor because they do not allocate resources efficiently or because they are not able to 
access modern technologies or superior inputs.  Schultz (1964) argued that farmers using 
traditional methods are maximizing output.  Without altering production technologies, 
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there would be negligible returns to further investments in land, education, or hours of 
work.  Varied evidence supports the conclusion that schooling has little reward in 
traditional agriculture compared to off-farm labor opportunities including Yang (1997) in 
China, Jolliffe (1998) in Ghana and Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1999) in Pakistan.   
Not all research has supported Schultz’s (1964) view that peasant farmers are 
“poor but efficient”.  Market failures such as incomplete commodity or labor markets, 
poor transportation, or asymmetric information may prevent farmers from equating input 
prices and marginal revenue products (Ball and Pounder 1996; Barrett, Shirland and 
Adesina 2008).  Poor access to credit or incomplete insurance markets may cause farmers 
to underinvest in capital or critical inputs such as fertilizer (Duflo 2006).  New 
technologies may be complementary with education or farm size, meaning that the least 
educated farmers and those on small plots may not adopt modern techniques (Welch 
1970; Feder, Just and Zilberman 1985).  Poverty itself may lead to poor decisions 
because malnutrition may alter behavior (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013).  However, there 
are several reasons to suspect that the plight of agricultural production advance is not as 
dire as suggested by available information at the time Schultz wrote.  Ball and Pounder 
(1996) argued that virtually all countries were no longer mired in the long-term low 
productivity equilibrium which Schultz characterized as traditional agriculture.  
Moreover, farmers can be taught to improve their resource allocations such as adopting 
high yielding seeds and fertilizers (Duflo 2006).  Our own work below will show that 
agriculture has been able to sustain productivity advances across all technologies, both 
labor and capital intensive. 
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Data 
Hayami and Ruttan (1971, 1985) pioneered empirical research on induced innovation in 
agriculture using data on 44 countries over the 20 year period from 1960 through 1980.  
Their work was based on data compiled by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
and FAO yearbooks.  Since then, the data sets have been greatly expanded, including 
many more countries with more consistent reporting of input levels. In addition, this 
study adds data spanning an additional 30 years from 1980 – 2010, a period when the 
percentage of the world population that was undernourished fell from 25% to 15% (FAO, 
2009).   
The main sources of data for this study are the Food and Agriculture Organization 
Statistics, Year Book of Labour Statistics, and the World Census of Agriculture.  The 
countries included in the data set varies from 79 in 1961 to 144 in 2010, depending on the 
availability of data on inputs and outputs. 
Following Hayami and Ruttan (1971, 1985), total agricultural output is 
represented in thousands of wheat equivalent units (i.e. the value of total agricultural 
production, evaluated at international prices, divided by the international price of wheat).   
The conversion to wheat equivalent units is innocuous as we could have left the output in 
constant international dollars, but the conversion to wheat makes our results consistent 
with the earlier studies. 
We include 5 inputs in the production function.  Land (H) is hectares of arable 
land.  Labor (L) is measured in thousands of male and female agricultural workers. 
Mechanical Capital (KM) is measured in thousands of tractors.  Fertilizer (F) is the sum 
of metric tons of nitrogen, phosphate, and potash.  
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In contrast to Hayami and Ruttan (1971, 1985), we add an additional capital 
measure to account for the use of draft animals in agricultural production.  Animal 
Capital (KA) is a weighted average of the stock of draft animals in the country including 
horses, oxen, mules, donkeys, camel, and buffalo.  We use two different sets of weights, 
one based on horsepower per animal and the other based on horsepower times the 
fraction of a 10 hour day the animal can produce.2  We then compute the weighted sum 
across the 6 draft animal species using		ܭ஺ ൌ ∑ ߱௜଺௜ୀଵ ∗ ௜ܰ, where ߱௜ is the horsepower 
weight and ௜ܰ is the number of draft animals of type i in the country.  In practice, the two 
sets of horsepower-weighted draft animals were highly correlated and results were very 
similar using either measure.  The results reported in this article use the workday * 
horsepower weights. 
Wages (W) are monthly equivalent earnings paid per agricultural worker, in U.S. 
dollars.  We use the Hayami-Ruttan (1985) estimated agricultural wages for the period 
1961-1980, supplemented by the wages reported in Elisiana, Fulginiti, and Perrin (1993) 
and the International Labor Organization Labor Statistics series.  Where there was 
disagreement among the various series, we used the wage that most closely represented 
the unskilled wage to provide some consistency across countries.  For wages after 1980, 
                                                            
2 Hicks (1997) provides estimates of average horsepower and the effective work day by draft animal which 
were used to compute the weights presented below.  A horse can provide 0.67 horsepower over a 10 hour 
day, while a camel can produce more horsepower per hour but only for 6 hours. 
  Horsepower  
Animal  ( HP)  HP*(hours per day/10) 
Draft horse 0.67  0.67 
Ox  0.60  0.36 
Mule  0.54  0.32 
Donkey  0.27  0.11 
Camel  0.87  0.52 
Buffalo  0.70  0.35 
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we relied on Oostendorp’s (2012) harmonized wage series based on household data 
across countries.   
The number of countries included in the data set depends on the availability of 
information.  Table 1 reports the number of countries included in the production function 
estimation and the lower-bound of the number of countries included in the derived 
demand regressions.3  We are able to greatly expand the number of countries included in 
the production function estimation compared to the 44 in Hayami-Ruttan.  We also 
greatly expand the number of countries for which we have wage information compared to 
the 20-28 available in Hayami-Ruttan.  As a result, we have more degrees of freedom to 
support our statistical tests than was available to Hayami and Ruttan. 
  Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the output measure and all inputs by 
year.  While the means reflect changes in the composition of countries with the required 
data over time, some trends are apparent.  There has been an increase in agricultural 
output, with the largest increase being between 1990 and 2000.  As agricultural land in 
production has fallen, yields have risen nearly four-fold.  The pace of productivity gains 
appears to have leveled off in the last 20 years, but this may be due to the inclusion of 
more small developing countries in the more recent periods.  Our data analysis will 
address those composition changes by using country fixed effects. 
The Estimated Agricultural Production Function 
Agricultural productivity has steadily increased over time.  As shown in Table 2, output 
per hectare doubled between 1960 and 1970 and doubled again by 1990.  Agricultural 
                                                            
3 Because information on the various inputs was not universally reported, we have more countries included 
in each of the input demand equations but the numbers reported in Table 1 are for the countries that have 
all inputs and wage information.   
  8 l Page
productivity leveled off thereafter.  The gains could reflect increased input application 
per hectare, rising productivity of the inputs, or some combination of the two4.   
We examine that issue following the original Cobb-Douglas (1928) strategy.  Let 
the ith country’s agricultural output in year t, ܳ௜௧, be of the Cobb-Douglas functional form 
(1)     ܳ௜௧ ൌ ܣ௜௧	ܪ௜௧ఈಹܮ௜௧ఈಽܭெ௜௧ఈಾܭ஺௜௧ఈಲܨ௜௧ఈಷ    
where Land (ܪ௜௧), Labor (ܮ௜௧), Mechanical Capital (ܭெ௜௧), Animal Capital (ܭ஺௜௧), and 
Fertilizer (ܨ௜௧) are the inputs into the production of wheat equivalent units of agricultural 
output.  The Hicksian aggregate technology term ܣ௜௧ has both time and country-specific 
components such that ln	ሺܣ௜௧ሻ ൌ ln	ሺܣሻ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ߙ்ݐ ൅ ߝ௜௧.   The country-specific fixed 
effect ߙ௜ reflects factors permanently affecting the country’s agricultural productivity 
including its land quality and agro-climatic region.  To the extent that the country does 
not vary its policies regulating agriculture, the fixed effect also captures time-invariant 
agricultural policies specific to the country.  The time effect ߙ்ݐ captures changes in 
technology that raise productivity across countries.  The coefficient ߙ்	measures the 
annual increase in world agricultural productivity.  The last term ߝ௜௧ is a transitory shock 
to the country’s agricultural production from factors such as weather or unanticipated 
commodity price fluctuations that alter the translation from other commodities to wheat 
equivalent units. 
The logarithmic form of Equation (1) represents the first-order Taylor 
approximation to an unknown production function.  The log form of the Cobb-Douglas 
specification can be tested against the second-order approximation given by the translog 
specification:  
                                                            
4 Ball et al (2016) estimate that 90 percent of growth in U.S. agricultural output between 1948 and 2013 
was due to productivity growth as opposed to increased inputs. 
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(2)    lnሺܳ௜௧ሻ ൌ ∑ ߚ௞ lnሺ ௜ܺ௧௞ሻ ൅ ଵଶ∑ ∑ ߚ௝௞lnሺ ௜ܺ௧௞ሻ ln൫ ௜ܺ௧௝൯ ൅ହ௝ୀଵହ௞ୀଵ lnሺܣ′ሻ ൅ହ௞ୀଵ ߛ௜ ൅
ߛ்ݐ ൅ ߳௜௧; ߚ௝௞ ൌ ߚ௞௝ 
where the ௜ܺ௧௞ represent the inputs in Equation (1).  The translog form has 15 more 
coefficients than the Cobb-Douglas form.  All specifications of the translog form resulted 
in estimates of ߚ௝௞ that were not significantly different from zero for all j and k.  The joint 
test that the ߚ௝௞ ൌ 0	∀݆, ݇ could not be rejected in the fixed-effect regressions and the 
addition of the 15 parameters only increased the explained variation of log output by 
0.0012 versus the R2 of 0.972 obtained with the fixed-effects regression using the Cobb-
Douglas form.  Therefore, we proceed under the assumption that the Cobb-Douglas form 
adequately approximates the unknown world agricultural production function.5   
 The Cobb-Douglas form provides a direct link between the theoretical 
propositions derived from neoclassical economics and the observed data (Orazem 1998).  
The coefficients ߙு, ߙ௅, ߙெ, ߙ஺, and	ߙி in Equation (1) are output elasticities.  The form 
for the kth input is  
(3)     ߙ௞ ൌ డொ೔೟డ௑ೖ೟ ∙
௑ೖ೟
ொ೔೟ ൌ
ெ௉ೖ
஺௉ೖ  
Profit maximization requires that all inputs be in the range 0 ൏ ܯ ௞ܲ ൏ ܣ ௞ܲ and so all the 
ߙ௞ must fall in the range [0, 1) for agricultural production to fall in stage II of production.  
If ߙு ൅	ߙ௅ ൅	ߙெ ൅	ߙ஺ ൅ 	ߙி ൌ 1, then agricultural production is characterized by 
constant returns to scale.  The Cobb-Douglas estimation is reported in Table 3. 
                                                            
5 Note that if our production function is fully specified so that ܳ௜௧ െ ܣ௜௧	ܪ௜௧ఈಹܮ௜௧ఈಽܭெ௜௧ఈಾܭ஺௜௧ఈಲܨ௜௧ఈಷ ൌ 0, the 
implicit function rule allows us to specify an equation where any one of the variables is a function of the 
rest of the variables.  That serves as justification for our regression where output is regressed against all the 
inputs.   
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All the estimated output elasticities lie between 0 and 1, and so agricultural 
production lies in Stage 2 of production where marginal products are positive but less 
than average products and derived factor demand curves are downward sloping in input 
prices.6  The sum of the output elasticities is 0.91 which is consistent with diminishing 
returns to scale.  However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients sum 
to 1.  Consequently, world agricultural production is not significantly different from a 
constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas form.  
The trend coefficient suggests that agricultural total factor productivity is 
increasing at 3.7% per year7.  The world population has increased at 1.4% per year over 
the 1960-2010 period according to data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
International Database.  As a result, agricultural productivity increases have outpaced 
world population growth over the 50-year period, leading to the slow but steady reduction 
in world malnutrition over time reported by the FAO (2009).   
Our assumption that the error term ߝ௜௧ is an iid random shock may be incorrect.  If 
instead, it is a missing input that interacts with the observed inputs, then it will be 
correlated with the regressors in equation (1) so that the estimated coefficients will be 
biased8.  However, if ߝ௜௧ also enters the production in the Cobb Douglas form, it will not 
                                                            
6 This condition is consistent with but not sufficient for concluding that agricultural inputs are efficiently 
allocated. 
7 The implied increase in output due to productivity over the 49 years period is a 5.93 fold increase, 
holding inputs at their 1961 levels.  The actual increase in world production over the time period was 3.26.  
This implies that 55 percent fewer inputs were required to produce 3.26 times the output in 2010 relative to 
1961. 
8 It is widely acknowledged that fixed effects estimation of production functions has not generally 
succeeded in solving the problem of endogenous input choice (Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry and Pakes 
2005).  The method relies on the strong assumption that the fixed effect does not change over time.  In 
addition, when there is measurement error in inputs, fixed effects can generate higher biases in the 
estimators than ordinary least squares.  Lastly, fixed effects estimations tends to provide estimates of 
capital coefficients that are much lower than capital’s cost share or which imply very low returns to scale.  
However, Ackerberg, et al (2005) note, “…whether or not one takes the fixed effects estimates as serious 
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bias the nonparametric analysis that follows because the Cobb-Douglas specification 
implies that the relationship between any two of the observed inputs will be unaffected by 
the addition of an additional unobserved input. 
Empirical Isoquants 
The Cobb-Douglas form allows us to trace out isoquants for each of the ten possible pairs 
of inputs included in the production function.  The changes in the height of these 
isoquants illustrate how the technology advances found in the last section show up in 
rising input productivities.  The pace of productivity gains is not the same across all 
inputs and so the changing slopes of these isoquants demonstrate the direction of 
technology bias in advancing productivity.   
 The Cobb-Douglas form imposes the condition that the marginal and average 
products differ only by a constant of proportionality.  Using equation (3), the marginal 
products of labor and machinery capital are 
(4)   ܯ ௅ܲ ൌ డொ೔೟డ௅೔೟ ൌ ߙ௅
ொ೔೟
௅೔೟  ; ܯ ௄ܲಾ ൌ
డொ೔೟
డ௄ಾ೔೟ ൌ ߙெ
ொ೔೟
௄ಾ೔೟ 
The slope of an isoquant is the ratio of the marginal products of the two inputs.  In 
this case, the slope will be െெ௉ಾெ௉ಽ ൌ െ
ఈಾ
ఈಽ
௅೔೟
௄ಾ೔೟ ൌ െ
ఈಾ
ఈಽ
஺௉ಾ
஺௉ಽ .  Importantly, when Cobb-
Douglas holds, the marginal products of any two inputs will be independent of the other 
input values.  That means that a scatter plot of any pair of inputs per unit output will be 
interpretable as an isoquant.  In this case, the scatter plot of ௅೔೟ொ೔೟	against 
௄ಾ೔೟
ொ೔೟  is the isoquant 
representing the trade-off between labor and mechanical capital in world agriculture.  The 
result is shown in Figure 1.  Developed countries, such as Canada, United States, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
estimates of structural production function parameters, the fixed effects decomposition of variation into 
within and between components often provides a useful reduced form look at a dataset” (p. 46). 
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Germany use capital-intensive production methods to produce wheat equivalent 
agricultural output, while developing countries such as India, Zambia, and Indonesia use 
more labor intensive methods.   
 We can show how technology involving the use of machinery and labor has 
evolved by comparing the scatter plots in 1961 and 2010.  In both years the inputs are 
normalized per unit of output, and so each represents the amount of labor and mechanical 
capital necessary to produce one unit of output, other inputs held fixed.  The movement 
of the isoquant toward the origin indicates rising input productivity, as shown in Figure 
29.   
This same strategy can be used to demonstrate the trade-offs between all 10 input 
pairs (see Appendix A).  Each isoquant is time-specific, reflecting the available 
technologies in use around the world at that point in time.  As input productivity 
increases over time, the scatter plots should shift toward the origin.  The magnitude of the 
movement toward the origin will indicate the pace of productivity advances for the input 
pair.  Parallel shifts in the isoquant will indicate that the productivity advances are equal, 
across the two inputs, while changes in the slope of the isoquant will indicate that the 
productivity advances are biased toward one input10.   
We devised two mechanisms to measure the relative magnitudes of the input-pair 
specific productivity advances over time.  One uses the fitted isoquants for the starting 
                                                            
9 This shift in a given isoquant toward the origin over time is what Chambers (1994) refers to as 
progressive technical change, that is change that “expands the input requirement set and allows input 
bundles formerly incapable of producing output y  to produce y.” (p. 206). 
10 Hicks described technical change as neutral if the optimal factor proportions are unaffected.  If the 
technological change results in a cost-minimizing allocation that lowers the amount of an input relative to 
another, is it referred to as input-saving, whereas if it increases the relative amount of the input, it is input-
using. (Antle and Capalbo 1988).  Note however, that we are only able to examine the relative changes in 
input use pairwise; therefore it is not necessarily clear whether technical change is using or saving in each 
input overall.  Antle and Capalbo propose an overall bias measure for each factor; however it’s estimation 
requires data on all the input prices, which are not available in our dataset. 
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and ending period, and the other uses the average productivity advance for each country 
from the starting to the ending period.  We derive each strategy in turn. 
The first strategy uses the two fitted isoquants as illustrated in Figure 3.  Let an 
arbitrary ray from the origin be defined by the equation ݔଶ ൌ ߙଵ ∗ ݔଵ.  The differential of 
ݔଶ	is ݀ݔଶ ൌ ߙଵ ∗ ݀ݔଵ.  Converting this into percentages to make the relative changes in 
input use comparable across inputs yields  ௗ௫మ௫మ ൌ
ఈభ∗ௗ௫భ
௫మ ൌ
ఈభ∗ௗ௫భ
ఈభ∗௫భ ൌ
ௗ௫భ
௫భ .  This implies that 
the percentage change in either input along a ray from the origin will give the percentage 
productivity improvement from the base period.  In Figure 3, the measure of input 
productivity gain will be  
(5)   Τଵଶ ൌ ሺ௫భభି௫భమሻ௫భభ ൌ
ఈభሺ௫భభି௫భమሻ
ఈభ௫భభ ൌ
ሺ௫మభି௫మమሻ
௫మభ ൌ ଶܶ
ଵ  
And so the measure of input productivity growth is specific to the input pair, and the 
productivity gain will be the same for both inputs in the pair.  Nevertheless, we may find 
that the gains differ in magnitude if we start in 1961 with a relatively high  ݔଵ intensity or 
a high ݔଶ intensity.  For that reason, we compute measures of productivity gains for any 2 
inputs j and k at 3 different rays from the origin: 
63.4o line:   ݔଶ ൌ 2ݔଵ 
(6)  45o  line:     ݔଶ ൌ ݔଵ 
26.6o  line: ݔଶ ൌ 0.5 ∗ ݔଵ  
 
If the change is greatest along the 63. 4o line, it suggests the isoquant became 
relatively flatter and is an indication that the productivity advance was input-saving for 
the input on the vertical axis. If the magnitude is greater along the 26.6o  line, the 
isoquants became relatively steeper, suggesting productivity improved faster in the input 
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on the horizontal axis. The results are reported in the first three columns of Table 4.  
Noting that all five inputs increased in productivity, meaning that less of each input was 
required to produce a unit of wheat in 2010 compared to 1961, the smallest relative 
efficiency gains were for labor.  Labor use decreased less relative to all other inputs per 
unit of output.  Fertilizer use per unit of output decreased only in comparison to labor and 
had equal efficiency gains in comparison to land.  The largest decline in use per acre was 
for draft animals whose utilization fell more than all its paired inputs although only 
modestly so compared to land.  Land use fell compared to mechanical capital and labor.  
The overall pattern of results implies that technical change led to the greatest reduction in 
use of animal capital and land and the least reduction in the use of labor and fertilizers.   
Because the FAO data base gradually added more developing countries to its 
panel data sets, the previous measure may overweight observations from developing 
countries in 2010 and overweight observations from developed countries in 1961.  To 
mitigate that concern, we developed an alternative measure of input productivity growth 
that relies on the countries that have input-pair observations in both 1961 and 2010.  For 
the country i pairs, ݔଶ௜ ൌ ߙ଴௜ ൅ ߙଵ௜ ∗ ݔଵ௜ , where ߙ଴௜ ൌ ݔଶଵ௜ െ ௫మమ
೔ ି௫మభ೔
௫భమ೔ ି௫భభ೔ ∗ ݔଵଵ
௜   and  ߙଵ௜ ൌ
ݔ22݅ െݔ21݅
ݔ12݅ െݔ11݅
 .    From this information, we can derive an estimate of Τ1݅2݅ ൌ 	 ఈభ೔ௗ௫భ
೔
ఈబ೔ାఈభ೔௫భ೔  where ݀ݔଵ
௜  
will be approximated by the change in the input levels from 1961 to 2010 in country i.  
Since it is arbitrary which input we assign as	ݔଵ௜ , we can compute this measure for each 
  15 l Page
input in the pair.  We report the absolute value of the median of all these country specific 
measures for every input pair in the last two columns of Table 4.11   
These results provide much clearer evidence of relative reductions in input use per 
unit of output.  The first four rows report the input pair productivity changes over time 
for land and each of the other inputs.  These measures demonstrate that the biggest gains 
in productivity occurred for land.  Labor use fell relative to all inputs except land.  Use of 
draft animals fell more than mechanical capital and fertilizer.  Fertilizer use fell least 
among the five inputs and mechanical capital use fell less than all the other inputs except 
for fertilizer.  To summarize, all inputs gained in productivity over the 50-year period, 
but input use per unit output fell most for land and then labor and fell least for fertilizer 
and mechanical capital.  
Derived Demand for Factors 
Hayami and Ruttan placed a great weight on labor costs in their explanation for technical 
change in agriculture.  The Cobb-Douglas approximation to the production function 
generates own- and cross-price relationships between wages and the five inputs.  These 
relationships show which inputs are complementary with or substitutes for labor. 
The derived demand for labor is the marginal revenue product of labor which, 
using Equation (3), is proportional to the observed average product: ܯܴ ௅ܲ ൌ ݌ ∙ ܯ ௅ܲ	 ൌ
݌ ∙ ߙ௅ ∙ ொ೔೟௅೔೟ .  Because wages equal marginal revenue products in equilibrium, we would 
expect an upward sloping relationship between agricultural wages and ߙ௅ ∙ ொ೔೟௅೔೟ .   To get a 
traditional labor demand curve, we plot the logarithm of the agricultural wage, ln	ሺ ௜ܹ௧ሻ 
                                                            
11 The median changes for all input pairs are negative, indicating a reduction in the amount of input per unit 
of output.  We report the absolute value to be consistent with the measures derived from the fitted 
isoquants, Τଵଶ. 
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against ln	ሺ௅೔೟ொ೔೟ሻ or the logarithm of agricultural labor per unit output.  We illustrate the 
relationship in Figure 4 along with the regression that describes the best linear fit through 
the scatterplots.   
Because the labor input is measured per unit of output, Figure 4 can be interpreted 
as tracing out the response of labor demand to wages along an isoquant.  The inverse of 
the slope, which equals െ1.72, is a measure of the substitution effect of a wage change.  
Following Hamermesh (1993, pp. 24-35), the substitution effect is ܵ௅ߪ ൌ െ1.72, where 
ܵ௅ is labor’s share in production, and ߪ is the elasticity of substitution.  The fundamental 
law of factor demand defines the long-run labor demand elasticity according as ߠ௅௅ ൌ
ܵ௅ሺߟ ൅ ߪሻ, with ߟ being the elasticity of demand for agricultural output.  Our estimate of 
labor’s share in production, from table 2 is 0.23.  Roberts and Schklenker (2010) estimate 
that the world elasticity of demand for agricultural commodities is -0.06, and so the scale 
effect, ܵ௅ߟ ൌ ሺെ0.06ሻሺ0.23ሻ ൌ 	െ0.014, is very small.  As a result, the long-run labor 
demand elasticity is -1.73 with the primary response being the substitution effect away 
from labor as wages rise. 
 The small scale effects enter the other input demand elasticities as well.  We 
illustrate the derivation of the long-run own- and cross-price elasticities with respect to 
the agricultural wage in Figures 5-8. The small scale elasticities are swamped by the large 
substitution effects, and so the long-run cross-price or own-price relationships have the 
same signs and approximate magnitudes as the output-constant effects.  Consequently, 
the slopes indicate if labor and the other inputs are substitutes or complements.  The plots 
of agricultural wages against the inputs show that mechanical capital and fertilizer have 
positive slopes, implying that mechanical capital and fertilizer use are substitutes with 
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agricultural labor.  Draft animals and agricultural land have negative slopes, and so they 
are complements with agricultural labor.    
These findings are consistent with our conclusions from Table 4 that input use has 
declined most for land, labor and animal capital and declined least for mechanical capital 
and fertilizer.  It appears that rising agricultural wages are indeed shaping the relative 
input use and technological change in agriculture as posited by Hayami and Ruttan.  
Unit Labor Cost and Allocative Efficiency 
A remaining puzzle is why countries seem to lag in agricultural productivity as found by 
Lagakos, and Waugh (2013) and Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh (2014).  While gains in 
agricultural productivity have been impressive over the past 50 years, the gains are not 
universal.  Some countries are not sharing in benefits of productivity advances across all 
five inputs considered.  We explore two possible reasons: agricultural trade policy and 
protection of property rights.  
As reviewed by Ball and Pounder (1996), market failures attributable to poor 
government policies are one of the reasons why farmers may not make efficient resource 
allocation decisions.  We explore two such policies: trade restrictions and protection of 
property rights.  Openness to trade may expose domestic producers to economic pressure 
that induces greater effort to improve yields or lower cost.  It may also expose domestic 
producers to new varieties, new technologies and new agronomic practices.  Agricultural 
productivity may also be affected by private property protection.  There is little incentive 
to invest in new technologies or raise yields if the farmer fears that the government 
cannot protect his rights to reap the reward from the investment or if the government 
itself takes the return either directly or through extortionary taxes.   
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It is easier to capture the effects of agricultural trade protection and polity by 
looking at input costs relative to productivity.  In our context, more protectionist policies 
may allow farmers to use technologies or to select output levels that are inefficient when 
compared to prevailing input or output prices.  Similarly, governments that do not protect 
property rights may cause farmers to hold back on investments that would be profitable if 
their returns were not subject to expropriation.12 These inefficiencies will not show up in 
the production function but in the resource allocation decisions.   
Efficient resource allocation implies that ௜ܹ௧ ൌ ܯܴ ௅ܲ ൌ ݌ ∙ ܯ ௅ܲ	 ൌ ݌ ∙ ߙ௅ ∙ ொ೔೟௅೔೟,  
where all variables are defined as before.  Rearranging, we have an observable form of 
real unit labor cost that is consistent with optimal input allocation:  
(7)   ܷܮܥ௜௧ ൌ ௐ೔೟∙௅೔೟ఈಽ∙ொ೔೟ ൌ ݌  
In this formulation, unit labor cost is identical to the marginal cost of agricultural 
production.  With perfect competition and zero transport costs across countries, the 
marginal cost should be identical across countries and equal to the world price of wheat.   
If countries are allocating resources optimally, there should be no relationship between 
unit labor cost and the wage rate.  High wage countries should have high labor 
productivity so that their unit labor costs are competitive with low wage countries.  
Consistent with our earlier results, high wage countries will invest more heavily in capital 
per worker in order to conserve on their more expensive labor input while boosting 
output per worker.  Low wage countries will use labor-intensive technologies, which 
lower output per worker on the margin.  However, trade protection and poor government 
                                                            
12 To illustrate this point, Frank Orazem undertook a USAID trip to assess whether soybeans could be 
grown profitably in Uganda during the Idi Amin era.  He reported that, “you could put a stick in the ground 
and it will grow in Uganda.  The only problem is that someone will shoot you and take the stick away.”   
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institutions may increase unit labor cost by distorting the technology adoption and 
resource allocation decisions. 
We test these hypotheses using the equation   
(8)    lnሺܷܮܥ௜௧ሻ ൌ 	߮଴ ൅ ߮ௐ lnሺ ௜ܹ௧ሻ ൅ ்߮௉ܶ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ߮஽ܦ௜௧ ൅	ߞ௜௧  
 
Our measure of agricultural trade protection, ܶ ௜ܲ௧,  was developed by Anderson et 
al. (2009) and Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009).  Their trade protection index varies 
between 0 (no price distortions from trade protection) to 1 (completely restrictive trade 
protection).  The data base has been made available on line at Anderson and Croser 
(2009).  As shown in Table 2, agricultural trade protection has remained almost constant 
over the past 50 years, but it varies substantially across countries.   
Our measure of protection of personal property is based on ܦ௜௧,	 the extent of 
democratic political institutions in the country.  Our use of the democracy measure as an 
indicator of property rights protection reflects the availability of data over the 50-year 
period required.  The longest available continuous measure of political freedom is the 
Polity IV Project available on line at Marshall and Jaggers (2007).  Higher values of 
polity should be correlated with stronger enforcement of the rule of law and protection of 
property rights.  The polity index varies from -10 (absolute dictatorship) to +10 
(approaching pure democracy).  Our assessment that the polity measure will reflect 
economic and political freedoms more generally is supported by its strong positive 
correlation with the Freedom House index of Political Freedom and the Heritage 
Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index for years where the series overlapped.  As shown 
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in Table 2, the Polity IV measure demonstrates a steady movement toward more 
democratic political institutions over time. 
In equation (8), we would expect that ߮ௐ ൌ 0 if resources are allocated 
efficiently.  However, political or economic institutions may cause farmers to allocate 
resources inefficiently.  If the latter two measures cause inefficient allocations as we 
hypothesized, we would expect that ்߮௉ ൐ 0 and ߮஽ ൏ 0.   
The limited temporal variation in trade policy and democratic institutions make it 
difficult to distinguish the effects of the economic and political institutions from the 
country-specific fixed effects.  In addition, as we illustrate in table 1, the sample size is 
greatly constrained by the requirement that we have information on wages and the 
institutional measures.  The number of observations falls by 73% and the number of 
countries by 63%.  Imposing fixed effects further limits the degrees of freedom because 
we have relatively few countries with at least two observations with the required data.  
For all these reasons, we only report the results without fixed effects imposed.  The 
results are suggestive, but not definitive.   
The results are reported in Table 5.  In the first column, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that unit labor cost is invariant to wages, consistent with efficient allocation of 
agricultural labor across countries.  Unit labor cost is falling by 3% each year, consistent 
with the 3% - 3.7% increase in productivity from the production function estimated in 
table 3.   When we add information on trade protection and democratic institutions, the 
coefficient on wages becomes statistically significant.  A 10% increase in wages raises 
the unit labor cost by approximately 2%.  As trade protection increases, unit labor cost 
increases, either by lowering agricultural productivity or raising input costs for farmers 
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insulated from competition.  Polity lowers unit labor cost, presumably increasing 
incentives to raise productivity through increased protection of property rights.  The unit 
labor cost increase from a one standard deviation change in the wage rate would be 
counteracted by a 0.55 standard deviation in polity or a 1.7 standard deviation decrease in 
trade protection or about 5.2 years of trend productivity growth.   
Conclusions 
This article expands on the Hayami-Ruttan tradition by increasing the number of 
countries included from 44 to 173 and the time frame from 20 years to 50 years.  The 
longer time series and the availability of data from many more countries allow us to make 
several useful additions to previous work. First, we show that the data are well-described 
by the Cobb-Douglas form.  This enables us to illustrate the changing shape of isoquants 
over the 50-year period.  In particular, we can demonstrate and measure the progress of 
agricultural productivity by the magnitude of the shift in isoquants toward the origin for 
each input pair in the production process.  We show that, holding fixed other inputs, the 
biggest productivity gains in the agricultural sector have occurred through reductions in 
the amount and land and labor used per unit of output produced. 
The expanded time series includes the period between 1980-2010 that had 
dramatic reductions in the incidence of malnutrition in the world, from 25% to 15%.  
Over the past 50 years, agricultural productivity has increased at 3.7% per year while the 
world population has increased at 1.4% per year.  This means agricultural productivity 
increases have outpaced world population growth, leading to slow but steady reductions 
in world malnutrition over time.   
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The data also allow us to demonstrate how input use varies with agriculture 
wages.  Our estimates show that the substitution effects of a wage change are large, while 
the scale effects are very small.  This implies that the slope of the isoquants reveal 
whether the other inputs are substitutes or complements with labor. We find that 
mechanical capital and fertilizer use are substitutes with agricultural labor, while draft 
animals and agricultural land are complements. 
Lastly, we explore why some countries seem to lag in agricultural productivity by 
examining the impacts of trade protection and polity (democracy) on unit labor costs.  
We find some suggestive evidence that trade protection raises unit labor cost either by 
lowing agricultural productivity or raising wages for farmers who do not have to 
compete.  Polity lowers unit labor cost, presumably increasing incentives to raise 
productivity.
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Table 1: Summary of the Number of Countries for which Complete Information is 
Available, by Year  
Number of Countries with Complete Information 
Year Production Function  
Production Function Plus 
Wage Information 
1961 78 25 
1970 84 31 
1980 143 35 
1990 140 47 
2000 160 39 
2010 145 28 
Total 750 205 
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Table 2. Average Output and Inputs per Year  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
Year Output Labor Land Fertilizer 
Mechanical 
Capital 
Animal 
Capital 
Real 
Wage 
Output/ 
Hectare 
Trade 
Protection Polity 
1961 9,809.5 4,405.4 8,411.2 209,853.4 77,725.8 4,511,446.7 421.8 4.0 0.2 1.5 
  (26,924.0) (18,244.9) (28,414.3) (763,300.8) (415,312.5) (14,212,839.6) (411.4) (9.4) (0.3) (7.8) 
1970 22,366.3 4,328.6 8,712.0 465,025.5 106,282.4 5,174,618.0 691.3 8.5 0.3 0.8 
  (60,562.1) (17,984.2) (28,615.8) (1,671,406.1) (487,829.7) (15,553,114.2) (652.4) (19.2) (0.3) (7.5) 
1980 20,050.9 6,325.4 8,853.6 784,677.5 144,919.0 5,782,430.5 768.0 9.6 0.4 0.6 
  (54,043.6) (34,310.5) (28,676.3) (2,757,953.5) (501,223.8) (17,288,083.2) (918.8) (38.5) (0.5) (7.7) 
1990 47,869.0 7,465.4 9,194.7 926,406.6 173,468.4 6,199,268.9 918.3 17.8 0.3 2.7 
  (139,345.3) (42,817.3) (29,169.7) (3,387,451.6) (534,845.5) (19,271,777.8) (1,109.9) (63.9) (0.5) (7.3) 
2000 86,291.4 7,178.1 8,011.1 801,843.3 149,445.5 5,680,634.8 853.0 24.0 0.2 5.8 
  (299,285.0) (42,654.6) (23,278.2) (3,315,150.8) (473,233.4) (18,418,032.9) (1,184.9) (42.2) (0.4) (5.2) 
2010 63,794.3 7,547.0 7,999.6 1,212,701.5 157,428.5 6,200,377.2 1,359.5 16.4 0.1 6.4 
  (235,805.3) (43,328.3) (22,208.8) (5,536,666.1) (496,390.6) (20,338,907.8) (1,549.6) (26.1) (0.3) (4.5) 
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Table 3. Cobb Douglas Regression  
Variable 1 2 
ln(labor) 0.215 0.235 
  (6.14) (4.81) 
ln(fertilizer) 0.249 0.063 
  (9.10) (3.28) 
ln(mechanical capital) 0.090 0.062 
  (4.52) (3.85) 
ln(animal capital) 0.100 0.242 
  (2.98) (3.54) 
ln(land) 0.222 0.309 
  (5.69) (3.77) 
Year 0.030 0.037 
  (25.0) (35.5) 
Constant -57.66 - 
  (24.01)  
N, n  750, 173  750, 173  
R2 0.91 0.97 
Fixed Effect  No Yes 
Returns to Scale 0.87 0.91 
Test of Constant Returns 
F(1,172) 43.1 0.85 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.  Standard errors corrected for clustering at the country level. 
N is the number of observations and n is the number of countries 
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Table 4. Measures of Input-Pair Specific Productivity Advances Over Time 
Τଵଶ Median Value of Τ1݅2݅
Input per Unit Output 63.4o 45o 26.6o Input 1 Input 2 
Mechanical Capital vs. Land 0.818 0.859 0.896 0.444 0.841 
Labor vs. Land 0.817 0.828 0.835  0.855 0.827 
Fertilizer vs. Land 0.719 0.723 0.718  0.129 0.827 
Animal Capital vs. Land 0.669 0.668 0.668  0.768 0.806 
Mechanical Capital vs. Labor 0.524 0.511 0.501 0.274 0.857 
Fertilizer vs. Labor 0.262 0.135 -0.003 0.198 0.862 
Animal Capital vs. Labor 0.518 0.515 0.512 0.797 0.850 
Fertilization vs. Mechanical Capital 0.480 0.492 0.500 0.154 0.367 
Mechanical Capital vs. Animal Capital 0.212 0.225 0.240 0.274 0.769 
Animal Capital vs. Fertilizer 0.635 0.598 0.546 0.794 0.129 
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Table 5. Unit Labor Cost Regression  
ln(unit labor cost) coefficient coefficient 
ln(wage) 0.089 0.188 
  (1.39) (2.19) 
polity  -0.052 
   (2.94) 
trade protection  0.293 
   (1.97) 
year -0.03 -0.029 
  (7.96) (7.56) 
constant 63.4 59.80 
  (8.47) (8.01) 
N, n 222,65 205,64 
R2 0.22 0.31 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.  Standard errors corrected for clustering at the country level. 
N is the number of observations and n is the number of countries   
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Figure 1. Empirical Isoquant 
 
Figure 2. Empirical Isoquants for 1961 and 2010 
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Figure 3. Illustration of Input-Pair Specific Productivity Advances Over Time 
 
Figure 4. Own-Price Effects of Agricultural Wages on Agricultural Labor, Holding Output Fixed 
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Figure 5. Cross-Price Effect of Agricultural Wage on Animal Capital, Holding Output Fixed 
 
Figure 6. Cross-Price Effect of Agricultural Wage on Agricultural Land, Holding Output Fixed
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Figure 7. Cross-Price Effect of Agricultural Wage on Mechanical Capital, Holding Output Fixed 
 
Figure 8. Cross-Price Effect of Agricultural Wage on Fertilizer Use, Holding Output Fixed 
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